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Drawing on the features of political and economic transformation in Central and South-eastern 
Europe, this article explores how the First Infrastructure Package which in 2001  liberalised rail 
freight markets in Europe affected the process of legislative compliance and market dynamics in 
the new EU-members. The article focuses on how these countries governments’ safeguarding of 
economic welfare of national voters hindered rail market opening and distorted the level of 
playing ground for competition between the incumbents and the new entrants.  
To understand the public administrators’ behaviours, the study looks into in the economic woes 
of the newly liberated countries which imposed considerable political pressures on the national 
governments. Opening of rail markets to competition magnified these problems because national 
incumbents did not know how to compete and earn market profits. Large financial losses that 
they incurred as a consequence of rail market contestability have seriously threatened the means 
of subsistence for many railway workers. Thus, the governments stepped in to subsidise the 
incumbents’ employment and service continuity. These developments reveal conflict between the 
national priorities and the European Commission’s desire for intra-rail and inter-modal 
competition.   
Yet, the results also indicate that despite unequal playing ground, private rail operators in 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania learned how to compete and accumulate working 
capital for expansion into the truck-served freight segment. Besides, the growth in markets 
captured by new entrants was not deterred by infrastructure fees which are among highest in 
Europe, the discrimination in access to rail terminals and an official favouritism towards 
incumbents. The explanations are rooted in socio-political transformation which created unique 
opportunities for entry into the rail freight sector and unleashed entrepreneurial dynamism. In 
order to minimise incompatibility between the national and the European interests, the article 
concluded that the European development funds, which the new member states receive should 
be channelled to remove the discriminatory praxis, dismantle the national railway monopolies, 
and build consensus between the national and the European prerogatives.  
 
                                                        
1 Gaustadalléen 21, NO 0349, Oslo, Norway, T: +4722573800, F: +4722609200, E: jlu@toi.no  
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1. Introduction 
This article explores how the adoption of the First Infrastructure Package2 which in 2001 opened 
the European rail freight markets to competition, has also restructured the rail business 
environments in the new EU-member states from state-owned monopolies to contestable market 
condition (Baumol, Panzar and Willing, 1982)3. 
A broad analytical framework was employed in order to shed proper light on complexity of the 
phenomenon studied. First, the contestable market theory provided conceptual underpinning for 
the EC-instigated opening of national rail freight markets to competition from private rail 
undertakings (Baumol, Panzar and Willing, 1986). Second, results from several studies showing 
that the new member states experienced severe economic predicament under adoption of the rail 
deregulation directives that caused their governments to intervene in reforming the national 
transportation sector have been incorporated in order to better understand how the socio-
economic surroundings impacted on implementation of the First Infrastructure Package (Drew, 
2008; Taylor and Ciechanski, 2008; Fingleton, Fox, Neven and Seabright, 1996). 
More specifically, this article explores 1) how the national governments in Central and South-
Eastern Europe stifled implementation of the First Infrastructure Package, 2) what factors, within 
this political-administrative context, may explain the relative success of private rail entrepreneurs 
and their imminent expansion into truck-served high-margin goods market, and 3) how the 
European Commission can facilitate competitiveness of rail freight transport versus truck 
conveyance, increase in freight tonnage carried by rail, and reduction in negative socio-
environmental externalities associated with dominance of motorised transport in the European 
freight market, which collectively constitute the socio-environmental objectives of the First 
Infrastructure Package.  
In order to uncover how the governments used the state ownership of national railways to 
constrain the professional freedoms of infrastructure managers (IMs), the incumbents, and the 
private rail undertakings, all affected by three rail deregulation directives 2001/12/13/14/EC)4, 
this article turns the analytical spotlight onto the governments’ involvement in rail freight 
                                                        
2 The First Infrastructure Package includes three directives:1) 2001/12/EC which a) provides infrastructure access 
rights to private rail undertakings offering international freight  services, b) separates accounts of passengers and 
freight operations, c) separates the functions of train carriage and infrastructure capacity allocation, and d) 
formulates the principles for infrastructure charging and licensing of new rail undertakings, 2) 2001/13/EC 
dealing with licensing of rail undertakings, and 2001/14/EC defining rules for allocation of infrastructure 
capacity, levying of charges for the use of infrastructure and safety certification. Generally speaking, these 
directives embody the socio-environmental goals of the Common Transport and Environment Policy which could 
be summarised as more intra-rail rivalry, improvement of rail freight service quality as compared to motorised 
conveyance, increase in freight tonnage shipped by rail, and reduction in negative socio-environmental 
externalities caused by dominance of road haulage in the European freight movement. 
3 The notion of  “contestable market condition” has been conceptually formulated by Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
who in 1982 published a book “Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure”. In this book 
contestable market condition has been defined as ”…. the one that is accessible to potential entrants and has the 
following properties. First, the potential entrants can, without restriction, serve the same market demands and 
use the same productive techniques as those available to the incumbent firms. Second, the potential entrants 
evaluate the profitability of entry at the incumbent firms’ pre-entry prices”. (p.5) 
4 Same as the endnote 5. 
EJTIR 9(1), March 2009, pp. 42-62 
Ludvigsen 
Liberalisation of rail freight markets in central and South-Eastern Europe: What the European commission can do 
to facilitate rail market opening. 
                                                                                                                                               
  
48 
sectors. Next, it explains why, despite the relative competitive distortion caused by the 
governments’ favoritism towards incumbents, the new rail entrants flourish in some of the newly 
liberated countries and prepare to enter into the (currently) truck-dominated segments of the 
freight market. Subsequently, it elaborates on how the European Commission can establish a 
level playing ground for competition between the incumbents and the new entrants, and by so 
doing, speed up the deregulation of rail freight markets in this European region, and thereby also 
reduce the hegemony of motorised transportation in Central and South-eastern Europe. 
The dynamics of rail markets in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and 
Bulgaria were analysed considering that the European rail deregulation legislation was adopted 
there in 2002 amidst the ongoing political and economic transformation from the central planning 
system to market-based liberal democracies. Therefore, in order to adequately understand the 
pace and the scope of rail market restructuring, the legacy from the communist era, as well as the 
specifics of transformation of both the rail sector and the surrounding society have been 
considered.  A combination of internal and external pressures for change that the railways in 
these countries encountered over 2003-2007 has grossly complicated the establishment of 
deregulated rail freight governance institutions and fair competition. It has also put their 
governments under tremendous political pressures to reconcile their EC-commitments with 
national interests which differ significantly from those of the established and rich EU-members.  
This analytical approach was also helpful for proposing how the European regulator may assist 
the new EU-member governments in reconciling the national and the European priorities, as well 
as how to support the private operators in contributing to  implementation of the European  
transport policy by competing successfully for freight traffic. 
2. Data sources and methods of analyses 
The article builds on empirical findings produced by “REORIENT”, a large EC-sponsored pan-
European research project within the EC’ sixth framework programme which 1) explored the 
features of national compliance with the First Infrastructure Package in Nordic, Central and 
South-eastern European countries and 2) identified the different types of barriers that still 
permeate the national railway systems, and hinder the focal countries from reaping the full 
benefits of rail deregulation. Factors driving these developments were examined using primary 
and secondary data. The main source of structured information was a eleven-country survey of 
public officials and rail operators (both the state-owned and the private ones), which assessed 
progress in railway deregulation, the national specifics of legislation adoption processes, the 
occurrence of different types of barriers, and their impacts on competition patterns in rail freight 
markets. In addition, results from a shipper survey in twelve European countries have been used 
here5. All together, the outcomes from the following international studies provided input to this 
article: 
1) REORIENT Consortium (2007). Interoperability Status and Progress in Implementation of 
the First Infrastructure Package in Ten European Countries, Deliverable 2.1, 
http://www.reorient.no  
2) REORIENT Consortium (2007). Is Rail Freight Still Popular in Central Europe? Views of 
Voting Public and Local Politicians in Ten European Countries, Deliverable 3.1, 
http://www.reorient.no  
                                                        
5 The REORIENT survey of public officials involved civil servants at national transportation ministries, 
competition authorities, and railway regulators in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece. 
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3) REORIENT Consortium (2007). Demand and Supply Structure for Inter-modal (Rail-
based) and Single-modal (All Truck) Freight Supply Solutions, Deliverable 6.1, 
http://www.reorient.no  
4) REORIENT Consortium (2007). Rail Market Opportunities in Central and South-eastern 
Europe”, Deliverable 6.2, http://www.reorient.no  
5) REORIENT Consortium. Barriers and Countermeasures Securing Seamless Freight Flows 
in Pan-European Corridors, Deliverable 5.1, http://www.reorient.no  
6) REORIENT Consortium (2007). Comprehensive Welfare Analysis, Deliverable 7.1, 
http://www.reorient.no   
3. Governments’ involvement in liberalisation of rail markets in central 
and south-eastern Europe 
The imposition by the First Infrastructure Package of functional devolution between rail 
operators and infrastructure managers (IMs) was driven by the need for intra-rail competition, 
non-discriminatory access to rail networks, gradual enhancement of rail freight competitiveness 
vis-à-vis motorised conveyance, and the ultimate reduction of socio-environmental harms 
(pollution, accidents and congestion) caused by truck hegemony in European freight transfer. 
This indicates that the European legislators considered the IMs’ freedom from political influence 
and interference as instrumental for improvement of railways’ competitiveness, and reduction of 
socio-environmental damage associated with dominance of motorised freight transfer. 
Although the functional split between the train operations and the allocation of infrastructure 
capacity was completed in Central and South-eastern European countries in 2003, the new rail 
statutory regimes installed in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria still include both units within one 
holding company. On the other hand, the deregulated market governance adopted by the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Romania has institutionally separated operators from infrastructure by 
splitting them into two independent organizations6.   
In analyzing the government roles in these two forms of organisational arrangements, 
Leviäkangas et al. (2006), made a distinction between the authority and the subsidiary models. 
Within the first organizational set-up the IMs remain a subsidiary within a state-owned holding 
company incorporating train operators, and other professional service providers such as 
information transfer and traction suppliers, and act as a state representative without any business 
interests of their own. Within the subsidiary model, however, the IMs are institutionally separated 
from the passenger and cargo operators and other service suppliers, and pursue their own 
business interests by maximizing returns from access to rail infrastructure. In this case, the IMs 
simply “lease” the rail track from the state and “sell” the network capacity to train operators. A 
typical example of the first solution is Poland while the second, is Slovakia.  Our data indicate 
that despite the fact that the governments’ legal mandate to influence the IMs professional 
conduct is broader under the authority arrangement, within both organizational blueprints, the 
national governments still play a crucial strategic role. 
But, in order to understand the reasons for the governments’ engagements into management and 
operations of the freight railway sectors we invoke the political and economic transformation that 
                                                        
6 For review of advancement in formal implementation of the First infrastructure Package and the Interoperability 
Directive see the REORIENT Deliverable 2.2 “Interoperability Status and Progress in Implementation of the First 
Infrastructure Package in Ten European Countries” posted at www.reorient.no  
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from the early 1990s onwards restructured the Central and South-eastern European countries 
from communist states into liberal democracies (Dobry,2002; Good, 1994) 7.   
The economic crisis of the early 1990s which followed the abolishment of communist regimes 
reduced considerably the scope of industrial activity, and demand for freight transportation in all 
former Eastern block nations (Geremek, 1999). Different national statistics provide different levels 
of economic downturn, but most of them agree that within 1990-1993, the output of transport 
services in these countries went down by as much as 20 percent, while the volumes of goods 
shipped decreased by 40 percent (Kornai, 2006; Kovacs, 1996). Adding to the complexity was the 
fact that after the political shift had been completed, and the economies started to grow again in 
1999, the transport industry had to cope with the dramatic changes in foreign trade. The political 
reorientation changed the direction of incoming goods: they ceased to flow from the east and 
instead arrived from the west. At the same time the commodity structure shifted from imports of 
raw materials and exports of semi-finished and/or consumer goods to the Soviet Union to large 
freight inflows from western countries, and virtually no exports to the east. These structural 
changes benefited mostly the motorised operators, who had been privatised in the early 1990s. In 
the national economies where about 75 percent of all goods used to be moved by railways, this 
shift undermined the ability of the state railways to serve the new freight markets. Shrinking 
demand for railway transport led to considerable lay-offs which in turn, invoked severe political 
dismay that threatened the national governments’ legitimacy as social guardians of public 
welfare. Faced with adverse socio-economic externalities of job losses suffered by the state 
railway workers, the governments involved themselves in management and funding of railway 
operations (Grobelny and Malinowski, 2007). The figure shows the percentage of the 1990 
workforce still employed in 2004 by the national railways in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland and Slovakia. For example 
Poland, Hungary and Slovenia had well below 50 per cent of their 1990 railway workers still 
employed in 20048. 
                                                        
7 The REORIENT WP3 international study explored the magnitude of social support for rail liberalisation policy 
among the voting public, local politicians, managers and employees at national and private rail freight 
companies, including also the trade unions. The survey concluded that both the employers and the employees at 
the state railways anticipate that many more workers will loose jobs in the future as a consequence of 
deregulation of the European rail freight market. For reference see REORIENT Deliverable 3.1”Is Rail Still 
Popular in Central Europe? Views of Voting Public and Local Politicians in Ten European Countries” at 
www.reorient.no   
8 The Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER) mentioned in its 2004 publication 
“Railways in an Enlarged Europe- Perspectives for the Sector in the New Member States of the European Union” 
that “On average these cuts in staff have been approximately proportional to the reduction of demand, and hence 
productivity has remained constant over the period of dramatic layoff – a considerable achievement considering 
the scale of the change. In spite of substantial difficulties in the past, the rail sector in the new member states has 
inherited a substantially higher market share than Western Europe. For instance, in 2000 the rail average freight 
market-share in the Central and South-eastern Europe was nearly 30 percent of the total freight tonnes-kilometres 
as compared with just 13 percent in Western Europe” (page 9). 
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Figure 1. Reduction in Railway Employment Levels in the New EU-member States over 1990-2004. 
Source: The publication of the Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies (CER) in 2004, 
“The Railways in an Enlarged Europe. Perspectives for the Sector in the New Member Sates of the European 
Union” page 9. 
 
Against this background, the 2002 opening of rail markets to private entrants put new pressures 
on national railways. Being government monopolies, they did not have experience in how to 
compete and earn market profits. Lack of managerial expertise and financial ability to cope with 
a contestable business environment led to operational disarray, which threatened the 
incumbents’ capacity to fulfill public transport obligations9. In order to secure the needed level of 
rail service, the governments stepped in again, and subsidized the incumbents’ employment and 
service provision10.  
The infrastructure managers’ (IMs) dependency on governmental transfers locked them into the 
state’s political commitments which, among others, include  
1. Support for loss-making national passenger and freight carriers.  
2. Subsidies for national operators’ infrastructure usage.   
3. Prioritisation of network access for national carriers over private users. 
By securing employment levels, state subsidies increased the power of trade unions and reduced 
the strategic latitude of the IMs’ leadership for completing the technical and operational reforms 
mandated by the EC directives11.  As a result, the state transfers constrained the IMs’ professional 
                                                        
9 The social transport obligation cannot be limited to passenger movement only, because many state-owned 
industries in the new EU member states in Central and South-eastern Europe are still obliged by law and by 
practice to use only the state-owned railways for transfer of all  types of shipments. 
10 Similar disruption occurred in the US following the post-1970 bankruptcies of major incumbent railroads in the 
North-east. Competition in the freight market served by these railroads had grown so strong that they could no 
longer cross-subsidize loss-making passenger service, including commuter traffic in the US major urban areas 
with earnings from freight carriage. The federal and the state governments thus were forced to take responsibility 
for funding continuous supply of rail passenger service. For reference, see Spychalski (1997):”Rail Transport: 
Retreat and Resurgence” in The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.53, 
September, pp.42-54.  
11 Needless to say the political priorities of national socio-economic policies may differ considerably from the 
European Transportation Policy in general and the goals of the First Infrastructure Package in particular. Roughly 
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autonomy for network maintenance, upgrades, and investments. By so doing, the government 
interventions also affected the quality of network access for incumbents and new entrants.  
The lack of the IMs’ professional freedom influenced not only the infrastructure allocation and 
pricing system, but also how the infrastructure users, i.e., the train operators, perform freight 
service supply, and eventually, how competitive rail services are as compared to truck. The fact 
that the chief executives at the IMs and national railways are still political nominees rather than 
industry leaders appointed on professional merits also reveals the degree of governments’ 
involvement12.  
Another important impact of the state’s intervention is that a large amount of intra-European 
cohesion, environment protection and inter-regional development funds which the new member 
states receive from the European Community and distribute to nationally prioritized needs, are 
not only to a large extent channeled to road building, but also to modernization of incumbents’ 
rolling stock and operations under the guise of “competitiveness-enhancing restructuring”13. 
As a consequence, the state ownership of both the IMs and the national railways caused 
significant operational irregularities, which in several cases hampered non-discriminatory access 
to, and fair pricing of, the track infrastructure. This in turn, distorted competition in rail service 
sector14. The state’s involvement in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary thus 
delayed the true implementation of the First Infrastructure Package and the subsequent 
Interoperability Directive15. 
However, an argument that is often voiced by the government officials and also some IMs 
maintains that the high-level of infrastructure fees that these countries charge for rail freight 
transfer actually signify the IMs’ operational autonomy. This autonomy arises from the 
government-granted freedom to levy the network charges that maximally recoup the costs of 
infrastructure usage, maintenance and administration. By so doing, the reasoning goes the 
governments do not intervene into IMs’ operational models, but judge their performance by 
financial outcomes only. 
To this end, the results from the REORIENT studies indicate that the governments’ interventions 
are not restricted only to economic instruments (e.g., employment subsidies) and enactment of 
rules and regulations (e.g., definitions of network technical conditions and user charges). Being 
the sole owner of national infrastructure within the authority arrangement and a sole shareholder 
within the subsidiary model, the state is in position to affect the IMs’ performance in many other 
                                                                                                                                                                             
speaking, the less economically liberal a government is, the more it will use its political might to preserve the 
employment stability at public enterprises and utilities. 
12 Two exceptions to this rule are represented by the state-owned freight carriers in Norway and Sweden where 
the state functions as financial investor only, and does not exercise its decision-making prerogatives.  
13 The Polish government’s transportation planning document issued in 2006 shows that between 2007 and 2013, 
Poland will receive about 19 billion Euros from the European Union funds  for ”Improvement of Infrastructure 
and Natural Environment”. Out of this, about 11 billion Euros will be channelled to building the new highways, 4 
billion and 760 million Euros will go to railways, 2 billion Euros will be invested in urban transit, 594 millions in 
shipping, and 396 millions in civil aviation (www.government.pl). 
14 Data from interviews with rail entrepreneurs in Poland carried out under the REORIENT WP5 study show very 
clearly that these new market entrants are very concerned over irregularities arising from intra-organizational 
connections between PKP PLK (the Polish IM) and PKP Cargo which constitute two subsidiaries within the state-
owned PKP Holding SA. As explained by informants, these irregularities involve transfers of information, 
resources and power, as well as existence of collective decision-making that do not correspond with the spirit of 
the First Infrastructure Package, although they do not necessarily violate the directives legally. Furthermore, the 
informants drew attention to the national market dominance of PKP Cargo, which several times have been 
charged by national competition authority with substantial financial penalties for obstruction of competition on 
the track.  
15 The Interoperability Directive, 2001/16/EC defines the technical specifications for interoperability (TSI) 
between the different national railway operations and infrastructure standards, plus modes of information 
transfer. 
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ways. Although the authority model, ceteris paribus, gives the government broader powers to 
influence the IM’s performance, the following empirically documented modes of behavior blur 
the distinction between these two organizational blueprints. 
• The state is represented on the board of national infrastructure management company 
and affects its decisions through operational, strategic and financial interventions 
reflecting its own socio-political priorities16. 
• The infrastructure financing schemes adopted by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic envision that the IM’s operational budget is composed of infrastructure usage-
fees and the state subsidies that together cover the total costs of network provision. Yet, 
despite the economic goal of recovering the main part of infrastructure costs from user 
charges, the IMs are still largely dependent on state transfers due to inability of national 
train-operating companies (passenger and freight) to pay for their network usage, and the 
actual infrastructure wear and tear caused by their traffic which still is much larger than 
that caused by the private carriers. 
• The First Infrastructure Package, and especially Directive 2001/14/EC, specifies the train 
path allocation procedures and the level of charges applicable to all track usages. 
However, informal interferences occur, especially when the state-owned train operators 
(passenger and cargo) enjoy priority (over private carriers) for network access needed for 
fulfillment of public service obligation. 
• Although the IMs prepare the technical documentation related to the needs for 
infrastructure developments and budgets for investments in networks improvements it is 
still the state which decides how much money from, say, the European socio-economic 
cohesion funds is channeled to railway sector and how this money is distributed between 
the national incumbent and the infrastructure managers. 
So, the governments’ influence over decisions taken by the railway and the IMs’ management 
boards creates a complex web of intra-and-inter-organizational relationships, which obscure 
these subjects’ functional autonomy irrespective of their legal organizational format. Therefore, 
the network of relationships between the state, the IMs and the incumbents influence the IMs’ 
strategic and operational performance which collectively supports the incumbents17, even if the 
formal organizational structures fulfill all requirements of liberalisation legislation. Thus, despite 
the seemingly higher level of professional latitude that the IMs enjoy within the subsidiary model, 
the real issue is not the type of legal organizational structure, but rather, how the government 
exercises its ownership prerogatives and what political goals it pursues through mobilization of 
formal and informal power. 
Hence, despite the legislation-mandated split, the infrastructure managers, the national rail 
carriers, and the governments in Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Romania still live in close symbiosis. This connection is ultimately based on the governments’ 
positions as: 
1. Sole proprietor of national rail infrastructure. 
2. Main source of subsidies for network usage, maintenance and investments.  
3. Owner of national cargo and passenger railways. 
                                                        
16 This situation is well exemplified by Poland, where a representative of the national Ministry of Infrastructure 
and Communication holds at the same time a seat on the board of PKP Regional Traffic Company, and the rail 
regulator, the Office for Railway Transport. 
17 The occurrence of informal social linkages between railway officials and railway operators is enhanced by the 
fact that all railway professionals in deregulated IMs and rail administration authorities originated from the 
national railways who in the past were the only providers of operational and managerial training. 
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4. Recipient and administrator of European funds promoting intra-European socio-
economic cohesion, protection of natural environment and regional development18.  
In order to understand the political motives behind the governments’ support for the national 
railways in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary, even after these 
countries joined the European Union, we look into the relationship between the governments’ 
commitments for the safeguarding of national interests and the fulfillment of the Common 
European Transport Policy. 
4. Conflict between the national interests and European commitments 
When the different countries’ domestic priorities are ideologically and economically congruent 
with the European postulates, the national governments generally use their political clout to align 
European considerations with country-specific interests. In so doing, the governments usually 
appeal to national precedence in order to respect the socio-political mood of country’s voters19.  
With reference to this situation, one may suggest that instead of trying to preserve the current 
employment levels, governments may use the national welfare systems to help out those who no 
longer are needed by technically and operationally more advanced IMs and national rail carriers. 
By skilfully marketing the benefits of rail market opening over the temporary sacrifices, 
governments may secure popular support for rail liberalisation, and even for gradual 
privatisation of cargo operators.  
Public subsidies protecting the employment at state-owned operators and infrastructure 
managers do not only preserve the status quo. When national incumbents cover their losses and 
investments from “public borrowings” financed by national and/or European tax payers, while 
private operators pay full infrastructure prices as well as market-determined interests charges on 
business loans and/or other capital securities, the level of the playing ground for domestic and 
international competition is seriously distorted and the contestability of the entire European 
freight market imperiled.  
In addition, subsidies make recipients ill-equipped for domestic and international rivalry, and 
hinder them from regaining operational, technical and financial fitness. Further, government 
grants incapacitate the recipients’ ability to absorb the high costs of new investments mandated 
by interoperability legislation, such as higher technical standards of operations management and 
more stringent safety and security regimes.  In the long run, prolonged subsidization reduces 
even more the incumbents’ ability to cope with intra-modal and inter-modal rivalry20. It is not a 
coincidence then that several government railways with limited decision-making autonomy such 
as PKP Cargo in Poland, ĈD in the Czech Republic, and MÁV in Hungary consistently lose 
                                                        
18 The REORIENT WP2 field investigation disclosed that the Transportation Ministries in Poland and Hungary 
have special departments for transfer of state “loans” to the IMs and the state-owned railways. The subsidies to 
the IMs cover operational deficits, which are not covered by the loss-making state railways, who still remain the 
largest network users. 
19 This statement is well illustrated by the slogans used by the Irish government before the national referendum 
on the European Union Lisbon Reform Treaty in June 2008 that in the case of rejection the country may loose the 
large scale socio-economic benefits arising from its EU-membership.  
20 Because straightforward subsidies to state enterprises are outlawed by the EC competition legislation, transfers 
of public funds are often defined as "state loans” that the national treasury extends to unprofitable operators in 
the public sector. Since the magnitude of public debt acquired by PKP CARGO and MÁV CARGO grew 
substantially over the last years, they constitute severe impediments to pending privatization which in Poland is 
scheduled for the period 2010-2020. In order to enhance the operator’s market attractiveness, several political 
factions call on moratorium of the public debt accumulated by PKP Cargo in Poland. In addition, the lack of 
financial solidity on the part of freight and passenger operators translates also into financial incapability to pay 
for infrastructure usage, and in turn leads to considerable budgetary deficits for PKP PLK and MÁV 
Infrastructure. 
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market shares to both, truck operators and private rail carriers (Grobelny and Malinowski, 2007; 
Kovacs, 1996)21. 
Still further, government transfers drain the public coffers of financial resources which otherwise 
could be used for infrastructure expansion, installation of ERTMS (European Rail Transport 
Management System), and/or lowering of infrastructure charges. 
Finally, governments’ interventions in infrastructure and railways’ management create political 
power asymmetry because private rail undertakings are grossly underrepresented in political 
decision-making forums. Incumbents, on the other hand, can easily access political 
establishments, and by so doing attract their attention, sentiments, and financial protection.  
This power asymmetry magnifies the risks assumed by private rail ventures with investments in 
new rail freight projects, more technically sophisticated rolling stock, and more advanced ICT 
installations. This, in turn, delays development of highly specialized rail service capable of 
competing with motorized operators in inter-modal freight segments. The above shows that 
governments have different socio-political agendas than the European Commission; they use 
their control over national railways to attain national political objectives rather than the goals of 
the European transport policy.  
To expose even more the incongruence between the governments’ national and European duties, 
we shall in the following discuss a situation where the European considerations are in conflict 
with national priorities. The example is a situation where governments have a preference for 
stable public sector employment and/or fulfillment of public transport obligations. In this case, 
there can be a conflict of interest between the governments’ political obligation to safeguard the 
welfare of national voters and their European commitments to implement the reforms mandated 
by membership in European Community. This conflict derives from the fact that the national 
administrators’ socio-political legitimacy in a given country is not determined by the economic 
efficiency of, say, the European transportation system, but rather by how well the current power 
wielders cater to socio-economic needs and sentiments of their voters.   
Balancing political allegiance to national and European priorities may be particularly difficult for 
governments in post-communist countries facing greater economic challenges and stronger 
welfare needs than their counterparts in the established and rich EU-members. These 
governments are facing two conflicting imperatives. On the one hand, they need to provide basic 
welfare to large groups of population who lost their means of subsistence due to the transition to 
a market economy, and who did not as yet manage to benefit from the new economic order 
(Kluegel, Mason and Wegener, 1995). On the other hand, these governments are aware that they 
need European money in order to be able to complete the large-scale economic restructuring, 
which again, preconditions future increases in the living standards of their voters. Given the 
interdependency between domestic economic growth and access to European markets for goods, 
services and capital, as well as regional development and structural cohesion funds, this “duality 
of structure” effectively restrains these governments’ freedom of action (Giddens, 1977). 
That’s why the governments often oppose resolution of country-specific problems by 
supranational bodies. In an attempt to meet the national priorities, they distance themselves from 
European commitments, except of course, when the European support serves their causes.  Thus, 
the governments’ participation in international political projects, which endanger the important 
domestic priorities, limits their strategic freedom of action. This specifically applies to 
international undertakings with high-level short-term national sacrifices and long-term 
uncertainty related to achievement of both the national and the European benefits.  
                                                        
21 As shown by the REORIENT WP6 study, the share of domestic freight market controlled by private rail 
undertakings in Poland and the Czech Republic reached  in 2007 20 p.c. which is by far one of the highest in 
Europe. At the same point in time, the Hungarian MÁV Cargo lost about 10 p.c. of freight volumes to motorised 
operators. 
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It is understandable, then, that when deregulation of European railways invokes some important 
socio-economic disadvantages such as higher unemployment and/or disruption of rail transport 
supply, governments will, in different ways,  oppose its fulfillment by protecting the state-owned 
railways from market forces22. An official explanation for using public money on state railways is 
to shield them from competition until they reinvent themselves through “financial re-
structuring” and become ready for privatization.  However, another distant but highly plausible 
reason is avoidance of high political costs arising from frustration of railway workers who under 
the previous regime enjoyed many sector-specific privileges and who today, together with their 
family members, exercise substantial electoral power23. This electoral power may be used to vote 
the politicians out of office. 
Seen from the European vantage point, a single member state which reforms its railways does not 
exert much impact on the entire European system. Only a uniform behavior of all European 
Community members may produce desirable changes in the European Railway Area.  
Under these conditions channeling of European cohesion and/or regional development funds to 
improve the national railways’ technical standards may be prudent, provided however that these 
investments will also enhance the quality of the trans-European network. By endowing the 
Central and South-eastern countries’ governments with additional resources, the European funds 
may increase their capacity for political maneuvering. Larger amounts of discretionary resources 
may reduce pressures for political tradeoffs that the public administrators face as regards 
channeling of scarce resources to important social demands such as high-quality health care 
versus uncertain European railway projects. Still another strategic measure that also may 
enhance the national governments’ allegiance to European causes may be channeling of the 
European funds to important national priorities against firm domestic commitments to 
improvements of national stretches of trans-European corridors composing  different parts of the 
Ten-T network24.  
One may argue that this is already happening via transfer of large regional development funds to 
Central and South-eastern European countries. However, when executing this operation, the EC 
may need to make sure that the European money is employed in a nondiscriminatory manner, 
and that it supports projects which benefit both the incumbents and new rail entrants. 
Investments in new rail infrastructure and/or network capacity improvements are the obvious 
targets for such undertakings. Yet, as shown by the European transfers to Poland and Hungary, 
these political goals are jeopardized when Community funds are channelled to areas which 
undermine the objectives of rail liberalisation either through building new highways or propping 
up the unprofitable state rail carriers. So, it may be suggested that the European Commission 
should make more efforts to ensure that the European financing schemes reconcile the national 
and the European political objectives25. This would also provide greater assurance to the 
individual country governments that their national policy actions reinforcing the European 
causes will be sponsored at the European level. 
                                                        
22 David Mason (1995, p.49) cited an assessment made by one Eastern European dissident historian saying: “These 
countries have removed many injustices from the previous political and social system. Yet in many cases, fresh 
social, economic and other injustices have taken the place of the old wrongs”..    
23 It is well known fact that under the communist regime the railway workers did not earn much but enjoyed 
many privileges such as retirement at the age of fifty five (against otherwise common sixty five), highly 
subsidised vacations, housing, and also (depending on the country) access to considerably cheaper heating 
material such as coal. Abolishment of these benefits in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary caused several 
strikes and/or strike threats organised by the railways trade unions in 2006 and 2007.  
24 TEN-T network is a system of ten inter-modal transport axes that connect the European Union members with 
each other and with neighbouring countries which will over 2007-2013 attract major investment funds from the 
European Commission and member states. 
25 As shown by the REORIENT WP2 and WP5 studies, these differ considerably not only between the countries, 
but also between the different departments within the same national governments. 
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As indicated, the delay in Central and South-eastern countries’ compliance with rail liberalisation 
could be causally linked to at least two types of political conflicts. The first relates to 
incompatibility between the new rail legislation’s goal to open rail freight markets to competition 
and the national priorities for welfare and stable employment. Introduction of measures, which 
in the short and/or medium-terms could be painful and unpopular among the countries’ voters, 
generate serious political risks that discourage national politicians from accepting the high social 
costs of rail liberalisation. The second conflict arises from the political and economic rivalry 
between the different national sectors for scarce domestic resources needed for proper 
functioning of their social welfare. The REORIENT survey of politicians and the voting public in 
ten Central and South-eastern countries shows clearly that fulfilment of social needs related to 
high-quality education, fighting of crime and proper health care scored higher on political 
priority than rebalancing of freight transfer between rail and truck, and restructuring of national 
railways26. Moreover, the levels of political conflicts arising from rivalry for scarce national 
resources are, in some important areas of legislative compliance, directly dependent on the 
absolute levels of the focal countries’ economic wealth. In particular, this refers to national 
abilities to invest in the modernization of railway infrastructure and adoption of new and costly 
technologies for rail operations management (such as European Rail Transport Management 
System). 
Within this political environment, it is not surprising that the magnitude of resources channelled 
by national governments to implementation of rail liberalisation directives and the ability to 
invest in international rail freight corridors are inadequate as seen from the perspective of the 
First Infrastructure Package27. 
The following section contrasts the governments’ retention of loss-making national railways and 
politically constrained infrastructure managers with the developments in rail freight markets 
served by private carriers. 
5. Market outlook for inter-modal rail service 
The fact that the regulatory authorities in Central and South-eastern European countries licensed 
a sizable number of new entrants who compete fiercely with incumbents, and also with each 
other, raises an important question: why did they do it? There are at least two answers to this 
question: Firstly, the governments in all Central and South-eastern countries are in great need of 
market-generated revenues, and private rail freight operators are, to a greater extent than many 
incumbents, regular payers of full price for infrastructure usage. Secondly, the national 
governments cannot totally disregard their European commitments.  
However, licensing of private rail entrants to run trains on the national networks under 
implementation of the basic requirements of rail liberalization legislation is not consistent with 
these governments expectation that these small operators would not threaten the incumbents. 
Yet, this very assumption seems to be driving the public administrators’ actions disfavouring the 
new entrants. 
Thus, a possible explanation for why the private rail operators in Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania have as yet not engaged themselves in competition 
with truck is that these countries’ rail governance apparatus still favours incumbents.  
                                                        
26 Same as the endnote 5. 
27 This situation was well summarized by Mr. Jean-Claude Juncker, a Prime Minister of Luxemburg and a 
chairman of the 13-nation group of euro-zone finance ministers who once observed: “We all know exactly what 
we shall do, but we do not know how to get re-elected after we have done it”, cited by The Economist of March 
13th, 2007. 
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However, using knowledge of business strategic development combined with observations of 
market expansion in other service provision sectors, one may conjecture that private rail 
ventures’ progression into the high-margin truck-served goods segment may be just behind the 
corner.  
Empirical studies show that business expansion is contingent on at least three antecedents:  
1. Sufficient managerial knowledge of risks arising from domain enlargement and 
competition skills needed for entrenchment in new market segments Hisrich, , 
McDougall and Oviatt, 2000). 
2. Availability of capital assets for enlargement of production capacity McDougall and 
Oviatt, 2000)..  
3. Sufficient financial resources accumulated through firms’ own profitable performance 
(Evans and Jovanovič, 1989; Porter, 1996, 1998).  
It is reasonable thus to assume that the venturing by new rail start-ups into high-value, high-
margin cargo is contingent on mastering new competition strategies, which must be learned 
through prior rivalry with incumbents in traditional rail markets. Hence, knowledge of 
competition in liberated rail markets coupled with access to financial assets needed for expansion 
of production capacity may both hinder and foster rail inter-modal advancement.  
These preconditions translate into:  
1. Good grasp of service quality dimensions required by shippers of high-value cargo 
(Ludvigsen, 1999)28.  
2. Possession of flatcars for transfer of inter-modal Load Carrying Devices (LCUs) such as 
swap-bodies, containers and semi-trailers, (which interchangeably can be ferried by sea-
going vessels and/or rail/road vehicles plus multi-system locomotives for seamless 
border crossings. 
3. Accumulation of large stocks of financial assets that provide cash for business expansion 
and/or ability to attract external investors by offering yields higher than other capital 
investments. 
Usually a combination of internal and external money is used for financing business growth29.   
This trend is corroborated by the floatation of shares by the two largest Polish private rail 
operators on the Warsaw stock exchange in 2007.  Also, in the Czech Republic and Romania, 
working capital of several private rail undertakings has been expanded through access to the 
stock exchange and acquisition of strategic investors. The increase in these companies’ equity 
foretells that access to private capital constitutes a contingency that depending on its character 
may either delay or speed up an entrepreneurial market expansion.  
Another indicator of investments in inter-modal service supply is a considerable increase in 
prices of rail flatcars, which in Poland alone rose by 25-30 percent over 2006. The country’s 
second largest private rail undertaking reported that the costs of refurbishing and repairing of 
the old equipment have also shot up by 35-40 percent due to overbooking of workshop capacity. 
This business source added also that none of the three big container platform manufacturers in 
Poland, The Czech Republic, and Belgium, can supply new equipment before the end of 2008. 
Confronted by the lack of second hand locomotives, the company will lease 5-10 new two-system 
engines from Angel Trains, a subsidiary of Bombardier SA, and invest 15-20 million Euros of its 
                                                        
28 As showed by Ludvigsen (1999, pp. 31-54) in “Freight Transport Supply and Demand Conditions in the Nordic 
Countries”, shippers do not differentiate between the quality required from rail inter-modal freight services and 
single-modal all-truck conveyance. Therefore, truck provides a baseline for quality levels required from inter-
modal rail operators. 
29 As registered by the REORIENT WP6 interview with major market players, one private rail entrepreneur from 
Poland complained that volumes of rail freight that his company transferred in 2006 grew by sixty percent only as 
compared to 2005, in contrast to 120 percent growth posted during both 2003 and 2004.    
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own money in development of inter-modal rail terminals at strategically located logistical hubs in 
Poland. The above developments suggest that these private rail undertakings are preparing 
themselves seriously for expansion into truck-dominated freight transfer markets. 
The figure below outlines the time-paced market expansion trajectory from small rail start-ups 
controlled by private owners to publicly quoted large-turnover companies and then on  further to 
international corporations with networks of subsidiaries and joint ventures in multiple cargo-
service markets. The graphic suggests that progression into more demanding high-margin 
service is contingent on rail managers’ acquisition of competition skills required for rivalry in 
new market segments, high growth of their own businesses that provide liquidity for funding of 
service expansion, and enlargement of capital stock through equity securitization or issuance of 
private bond obligations (Shane, 1998). The three business growth trajectories depict the rail 
business environments characterised by the different levels of market deregulation, growth 
opportunities, and availability of internal and external capital, which together affect managerial 
propensity for rail business expansion.  
 
 
Figure 2. Entrepreneurial Expansion Trajectory in Rail Freight Markets 
 
The above reviewed strategic behaviours of private rail entrants point to structural changes in the 
supply of rail freight service, and imminent emergence of inter-modal rail versus all-road freight 
transport competition in Central and South-eastern European countries.  
6. Summary and recommendations 
The evidence compiled by the REORIENT project and synthesized in this article indicates that 
neither incomplete regulatory implementation of rail liberalisation directives nor the government 
protection of national incumbents can be considered as effective barriers to intra-modal and inter-
modal competition in Central and South-eastern European countries. These two types of 
obstacles thus do not act as insurmountable hindrances to attainment of the socio-environmental 
objectives of the First Infrastructure Package.   
It appears that both of these institutional and political barriers may be overcome by 
entrepreneurial spirit and propensity for risk-taking. The evidence examined suggests that 
collectively, these two social capital assets have spurred new rivalry methods and accumulation 
of risk-friendly venture capital. What is even more surprising is that these changes in market 
structure occurred over the last five years in business environments beset by large economic and 
political volatility caused by transition from the communist regime to liberal democratic system, 
and an explicit support of incumbent railways by the national governments.   
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The emerging horizontal and vertical expansion30 in rail freight markets may thus justify a 
positive expectation that the private railway industry in Central and South-eastern Europe may 
grow more quickly than expected, and definitely swifter than in the Nordic region, and 
contribute materially to attainment of political objectives of the European Commission31. 
The rail sector re-structuring trajectories within the new EU- member states seem to follow a 
pattern of business expansion which also occurs in other manufacturing and service provision 
sectors, and are basically driven by entrepreneurial vision, fierce competition, and ability to 
utilize regulatory opportunities for business growth. These results also suggest that achievement 
of a more competitively robust European rail freight industry is to a higher degree facilitated by 
flourishing rail entrepreneurs than by modernisation of the national incumbents.  
This raises two important questions of how the European regulator may help 1) the member 
states to reconcile the national needs with European priorities, and 2) the private rail 
entrepreneurs in their fight with administrative discrimination, so that they may contribute even 
more to fulfilment of socio-environmental objectives of the European Community.   
Transfers of large amounts of European money to national priorities of Central and South-
Eastern European countries may need to be contingent on removal of discriminatory praxis in the 
railway sector. Further, the European funds need to be channelled to rail infrastructure projects 
that will benefit the new and the incumbent operators, and contribute to technical advancement 
of trans-European inter-modal corridors.  
The European Investment Bank may extend some “soft” loans to technically fit but financially 
weak small rail ventures in order to offset the discriminatory effects of subsidies that the national 
railways receive from the public purse and to motivate private rail carriers to invest in higher 
quality, more sophisticated rail freight service.  
Despite the fact that the professional decision-making freedom of infrastructure managers could 
be constrained by the state’s interventions under both the authority and the subsidiary 
organisational models, the European Commission may insist on a gradual transition by the 
member states towards the subsidiary structure, whereby IMs, institutionally separated from the 
national railways remain less exposed to financial woes of national cargo operators. 
As regards legislative amendments, three executive measures may be proposed:  
1. Those that scale-back the dominant positions of national railways through gradual 
privatisation.  
2. Usage of national welfare systems to help railway workers who need new skills in order 
to retain jobs in technically more sophisticated railway companies.  
3. Provision of administrative and financial assistance to aspiring new rail entrepreneurs 
who want to enter rail freight markets. 
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